A Response to Mizo Student Union, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU)

The Memorandum submitted by the Mizo Student Union of JNU, to the Prime Minister of India on 1st September 2017 is, to say the least, shocking and banal. It is nothing but a message of ‘hateful propaganda and sensationalism’. It needs to be scrutinised, every word and sentence, because it lacks not only any humanistic and ethical concerns, but even worse, drives home a propaganda and a wrong articulation and presentation of history. The memorandum seems like an extension of the chauvinism of the Assam Movement that they faced, which has entered a new wave in articulating the other as the outsider or their enemies. What we can see from the memorandum is nothing but a case of the rising xenophobia and hitlerism in the state of Mizoram.

The Union is embarrassingly wrong when it writes that the Chakmas do not share any common history, ancestry, customs and traditions with the Mizos. For all we know, both are Jhummis! That’s hell of a cultural sharing, is it not? The Union also seems to assume the existence of Mizoram state, with clear distinctions between the categories of Mizos and non Mizos, and with fixed spatial boundaries as early as the early nineteenth century. Their argument that the recent protest of the Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP) of some Chakma students entering in a MBBS Programme has to be seen in the light of the fear of the ‘illegal’ and unnatural growth of the Chakmas in the state of Mizoram is unabashedly shameful. On the one hand, they seem to quote articles from the Constitution, at ease, but when it comes to the Chakmas they become a common enemy, with no rights whatsoever. The union appears to be fond of conspiracy theory which determines anti-minority sentiments in other parts of the country. It provocatively suggests that the Chakma Autonomous Council was formed to weaken the Mizo National Front. However, here, they safely ignore the question of rights.

One might ask, do such statements from an organisation claiming to fight for minority rights, seated high up in the ivory towers of the most reputed academic space like JNU, one of its kind? The answer is no. The social in Mizoram is influenced, controlled by many non-state actors–MZP, Young Mizo Association (YMA), Presbyterian Church and so on. They run a parallel government in the state, and this is not an exaggeration. Interestingly enough, the Union echoes the same spirit of these non-state actors in regard to the population figures of 1901 to 1941, which is even denied by the Mizoram government in its response to the National Human Rights Commission in 2014. Such narratives produced by the Union, are in tune with the way these above mentioned Organisations place themselves in the social life in Mizoram. They practice a kind of necropolitics which is borderline violent.

The constant creation of the categories of the insider and the outsider is a typical case in point here. They speak of chauvinism and jingoism that have become normalized in the everyday experience for the Chakmas in Mizoram. If the Union wishes to speak of history, we should also point out to the fact that the Chittagong Hills Tracts(CHT) is an area home to the Chakmas. Part of the CHT is in Mizoram, hence technically, if we were to adhere to that logic of ecological fixity of identity, one has to go back to how the boundaries were drawn. It was done by the British and their cartography, not the Chakmas. The dam that flooded their land in Bangladesh, led to a treaty which is constitutionally approved. Will the Union be willing to take the debate to those quarters?

To return to their notion of legal and illegal immigrants, it is public secret that the MNF harassed and killed many Burmese people belonging to the Mizo-Kuki-Chin group, back in the 80s, to which the Mizos claim their ancestry, history and roots. The YMA appreciated such acts from the sidewalks. Those Burmese, now, forms the backbone of the economy of Aizawl. Most traders who bring back goods from Burma and other parts of Maniland Southeast Asia, are primarily Burmese. However, they are accommodated into the larger Mizo society. Why is the Chakma community forcibly kept outside the larger conglomerate of Mizo society?

Hate produces ‘concrete others’ (Benhabib 1996). ‘Chakmas’ can be categorised as concrete others in contemporary Mizoram. Otherisation and hate is made available, for there are well-defined categories of who are ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Hage 2006). In a way, the other make the self more pronounced, even defines the self. As Taylor (2001) defines, how the whole notion of defining oneself is constructed when one knows what is good or bad for oneself.  The Chakmas are prevented from experiencing any belonging–cultural and social–in their everyday. Infact, their bodily disposition, mental and material presence is questioned. Their everyday is incomplete without receiving hatred and othering.

Journalist like Sanjoy Hazarika and the whole brigade of son of the soil, khilonjiya academicians of North-east, gave statistical excuses, in creating a fear of minorities growing large. The Union’s point here is not an aberration and is in perfect sync with such chauvinist standpoints on history and politics. We would like to highlight an instance where statistical excuses are exercised in order to justify the actions of chauvinism and jingoism.

A history of a differentiated taxation, levied on the Mizos and Chakmas respectively, is used as a tool to suggest that these two communities in-fact are different from each other. Accordingly, Chakmas are considered as foreigner because they were levied a tax of five rupees by the British, whereas the Mizos and their kin tribes were levied only a sum of two rupees This account is to be found in the letter that the Superindent of Lushai Hills Shri. S. Barkataki, wrote: D.O No. II-7/50/56-8 dated Aijal 11th October 1950 to R.V Subrahmanian, Secretary to the Government of Assam for Tribal Affairs. It is a fact that Mr. Barkataki was neither a historian nor an ethnologist or anthropologist. Hence, such factual errors were corrected by his former officer, Mr. KGR Iyer, IAS, Mizo District, with his report vide No. GP.21/55/56 dated Aijal the 27th October 1955, which was submitted to the Government of Assam. The Mizos conveniently ignores and hides such historical documents and facts, on one hand, and on the other, goes on circulating only the documents such as that incorrect letter, which states different taxes being levied. Infact, Mr. Barkatai himself admitted on a later date that he had no knowledge about the Chakmas being the indigenous people of Mizoram. Even then, how can one drive home the point that one ought to be treated as different, just because the tax levied were different. Is it not a colonial way of discriminating or a kind of divide and rule?

The mistake of Mr. Barkataki was an organised attempt in order to project a community in different light. He acted under the orders of a Mr. A. Macdonald, the Superintendent of Lushai Hills who thought that declaring the Chakmas as indigenous people will lead to losing of income for the government of Assam. He writes that, “If the Chakmas are treated as non-Lushais they will be liable to pay house tax at the rate of Rs 5/- and also other taxes such as Court and Stamp duties which will bring in an additional revenue of over ten thousand annually. I am in favour of adopting this course”. However, it was Mr. A. Macdonald himself who with his Order No. 734-47G of 29 April 1946 had declared that the Chakmas are the natives of the Lushai Hills just like the “Lushais” or Mizos. This makes it clear that the Chakmas were accepted as natives, by 1946, however, in the contemporary frame of politics, in Mizoram and in student spaces such a Mizo Student Union of JNU, a repeated attempt is being made to criminalize them and even suggest that they are the root causes of disharmony in the state.

Hence, the colonial government, with the help of local administrators, managed to create a deliberate categorization and mis-representation of a community and thus aimed at economic gains from so called non-economic areas. Similar accounts are seen, which justifies the Assam Agitation, the political contours of student bodies in Arunachal Pradesh, the Nellie massacre, Bodoland violence, among others, and constantly re-produce statistical exercises and excuses.

Pangsau Collective

 

References:

Benhabib, S (1996). Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Hage, G (2006). Insiders and Outsiders. In Beilharz and Hogan (eds.), Sociology: Place, Time and Division, Oxford University Press.

Ticking Hydro-Bombs and Life in the Brahmaputra Valley

Dr. Siddhartha Kumar Lahiri

IMG-20170827-WA0018

NE India finds a beautiful combination of valley-range relationship. If lofty mountains like the Eastern Himalayas force the monsoon to yield orographic precipitation; there is further supplementation to the big rivers by the glacial melt. A huge amount of water and sediments constituted of heavier bed-loads and finer suspended loads are being carried continuously by different streams and rivers related principally to the Brahmaputra River system. As per the recent estimates, sediment yield of the Brahmaputra is 852.4t/km2/yr which is the highest in the world (Latrubesse, 2008). With a mean annual discharge of 21,200m3/s, measured at Bahadurabad in Bangladesh, Brahmaputra is the seventh largest river in the world (Tandon and Sinha, 2007). The complex source-sink relationship of the Himalayas and the Bay of Bengal connected by the massive Brahmaputra River system has suddenly become highly vulnerable due to the proposed and ongoing construction of some of the biggest dams and hydro-power projects (Fig. 1).

arunachal district and dams

Fig. 1. Proposed sites of big dams and the associated ‘Hydro-bombs’ in the Arunachal Pradesh. Work has already begun in some of the sites. Life in the upper Assam valley is in dire straits. (Source: Neeraj Vagholikar, Sanctuary Asia)

An estimated capacity of 60,000 megawatt electricity generation is targeted (Lahiri &Borgohain, 2011). How big is this number? The present day need of electricity at its peak hour for the entire NE India is less than 5000 megawatt. Then, why so much of hydro-electricity generation is targeted? The answer is simple and can be found in the colonial legacy of the area. The people living in the place for centuries were never considered as stakeholders of significance whenever big issues involving big capital like energy sector came into the forefront.

Campaigning against the big dams all over the world has already reached such a proportion that none of the advanced countries intend to raise even a single big dam in their own territories fearing sharp resistance from different corners of the civil society. It has already been recognised that leave aside all negative impacts, if alone the ecological alteration is considered, post-dam scenario offers a no return situation. However, for the third world countries, pedagogy for the oppressed takes a ‘U’-turn (See: World Bank, Water and Development, 2010). Official documents, more or less all over India, are tailored according to the needs of the big capital investors, take hardly any time to issue NOCs; suggesting routinely huge benefits at little costs. But as soon as the moments of vast devastation comes, the bogeys of ‘extreme events’ (Ziegler et al., 2014) (hence, lack of adequate administrative preparedness); ‘inattentive or callousness of the lower level stuffs’ are raised to divert the woes of the sufferers. The sufferers narrate their experiences before the TV channels; hearts of the safer spectators melt; donations pour in and one party shouts the mismanagement in supplying relief and the party in the power boasts of their promptness in reaching the flood affected people. However, during the mock shows of TV battles, it is concealed that every year, with addition of new big dams, increasing numbers of hydro-power bombs are planted and at some points of time these are supposed to blast. For most of the big dam constructions, the down-stream impact of probable ‘flash floods’ were never studied in detail. But even a gross estimate can reveal the magnitude of havoc. Let us take a simple example. We have mentioned above the mean annual rate of water discharge measured through the Brahmaputra is about 21,200 m3/s. Let us consider a tributary river through which lesser than one hundred times of this volume flows which is say, 200 m3/s. If a dam suddenly releases water accumulated for just three days, the volume of water is about 5.2 × 107 m3. What does it literally mean? It simply shows that a field 10km long and 1 km wide becomes submerged under 5m (single storied building) high water column within minutes. One can well imagine its impact. The incubating dangers in big dams are nothing but the ticking hydro-bombs – who can deny it? Big dams are an immediate threat to the life of the Brahmaputra valley.

This will be the right place to have a quick look of ‘life’ in the Brahmaputra valley. Though Brahmaputra valley is famous for the ‘Assam Tea’ to the external world; the richness of its natural resources are present in very diverse forms on the surface and at different depths of the subsurface. If tea, different varieties of rice and citrus plants are there on the open space for everybody to see; there is limestone at shallower depths; coal at a little more depth and then oil and gas in the depth range of 1.5 – 5.0 kms. Thanks to the British Raj which made very cautious moves to keep the original inhabitants of the place away from its meticulously planned enclaves of economic activities where labourers from different places of India were brought to till and farm the ‘Lords’ Gardens’ following the similar colonial policies practised in the West Indies Islands and elsewhere like Mauritius.

The British rulers made considerable efforts to explore (Rennell, 1765; Wilcox, 1830) and develop waterways because river transport mechanism was the cheapest among all types of transport systems. Railway tracts were laid down with equal enthusiasm where connectivity through water ways was not possible. Strangely, even after the constitutional power transfer in the August 15, 1947; semi-colonial and semi-feudal socio-economic structure was maintained and preserved in the most sacrosanct manner by the Indian state which treated the NE India a ‘remote place’ from its perception of the mainland India (A simple example is, an ONGC employee posted in the NE states gets a ‘remote area allowance’). A remarkable difference between the ‘British Raj’ and the ‘Swaraj’ was, waterways were not managed properly by the ‘Swarajwallahs’ and a costly roadway transport system was encouraged to appease principally the truck and other motor car lobbies belonging mostly to the ‘cow belt’ of India. Subsequently, the roadways deteriorated a lot which helped to consolidate the ‘remoteness’ discourse and ever-inflated price tags for even the most essential goods like potatoes and onions.

The local political machinery is treated by the Indian state as an equivalent to a municipal board which is practically dissociated from the management and decision-making on most of the major resources like oil, coal and tea. In annual budget reports, the accountancy of what exactly is taken away from the state is hardly mentioned. The highlights of the matter mostly show a small basket of revenue collection and a huge basket of ‘grants from the centre’ and the people belonging to the state are made to believe that unless certain ‘grants’ and ‘doles’ come from the ‘centre’, it may collapse at any time. To ensure the ‘security of the people’ the ‘strong centre’ should be given a ‘free hand’ to explore and exploit different mineral and oil resources and the lately added item the ‘Water resources’.

During the ongoing period of unprecedented length of global recession when the safer heavens of big foreign capital investments are shrinking at a very faster pace; any market expert, whatever might be her/his political affiliation; will admit that the hydro-power sectors promising a sustainable rate of super profit for a century in ideal situations and at least half a century for even the most conservative estimates, is highly tempting. Thus, in spite of getting continuous signals of the magnitude of dangers from the big dams, the canards of developments by constructing big dams are continuously been raised by the official political class in power. They have sold themselves to the whims of the corporate class. Right at the moment, the people of the Brahmaputra valley vis-a-vis their relationship with the projects of big dams seem to stand as described by two social scientists in a slightly different context about 180 years back:

“…veiled by religious and political illusions, it (Read: the big capital) has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation…all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face, with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.” (Marx & Engels, 1848)

(The author is an Associate Professor in the Department of Applied Geology, Dibrugarh University, Assam and the editor of South East Asian Journal of Sedimentary Basin Research. He brings in a rare element of interdisciplinary research, between natural and social sciences. He is also associated with Natun Padatik, as an Associate Editor, and can be reached at siddharthalahiri@dibru.ac.in)

References:
Lahiri, S.K., Borgohain, J., 2011. Rohmoria’s Challenge : Natural Disasters, Popular Protests and State Apathy, Economic and Political Weekly XLVI ( 2), 31-35.

Latrubesse, E., 2008. Patterns of anabranching channels: the ultimate end-member adjustment of mega rivers. Geomorphology 101, 130–145.

Marx, K., Engels, F., 1848. Manifesto of the Communist Party, Translated in English by Samuel moore in 1888 from the original German text, 38-39.

Rennell, J., 1765. A general map of the River Baramputrey, from its confluence with the Ifsamuty near Dacca towards Assam, India Office Library and Records, London, UK.

Tandon, S.K., Sinha, R., 2007. Geology of large rivers. In: Gupta, A. (Ed.), Large Rivers: Geomorphology and Management. John Wiley & Sons, pp. 7–28.

Wilcox, R., 1830. Map of the Brahmaputra and Ichamati Rivers. Reduced and drawn by M.H. Dias, India Office Library and records, London, UK

Ziegler, A.D., Wasson, R.J., Bhardwaj, A., Sundriyal, Y.P., Sati, S.P., Juyal, N., Nautiyal, V., Srivastava, P., Gillen J., and Saklani, U.,2014. Pilgrims, progress, and the political economy of disaster preparedness – the example of the 2013 Uttarakhand flood and Kedarnath disaster. Hydrological Processes, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Writing North-East

North-East of India or India’s North-East is essentially an idea of space. It is a hybrid space, with each community that makes up this region having a distinctive history of their own. The structural homology of the hills and the plains presents us with a social world that is both complex and contested. The various complexities and contestations that are witnessed in contemporary North-East are manufactured by various actors with their own agendas. Phenomenons such as insurgency, counter-insurgency, uneven-development, autonomy demands, floods, natural resource extraction, Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA), inter-ethnic conflict, inter-religious violence and festivals, among others, make up the everyday social world in the North-East.

As far as historical accounts allow us, the different communities that are home to the North-East, migrated into the region at some point or the other. Pangsau Pass, located in the Patkai hills, forms one among the many entry points of communities into the North-East. We wish to use Pangsau as a symbolic and historical entity to draw attention to the shared history of critical crossings and human interactions.

The idea for Pangsau is rooted in our collective efforts to understand India’s North-East from diverse perspectives, with the help of individuals from multiple backgrounds. While specific state or issues remain the core focus of research that activists and scholars engage with, thinking of those, in terms of the region, throws questions which have no simple answer. The inability of the national media to report about the region is a truth beyond doubt. Alternative media platforms have either become commercialised, or limits itself to specific questions or parts of the North-East. Pangsau intricately captures the fluidity, hybridity, creolised processes, migration history, cultural, economic and political exchanges, among others, that constitutes the North-East as a region. In its essence, it seeks to recover the life-worlds and multiple experiences of various communities of the region, and archive common and possible universal grounds that make everyday life possible. This blog attempts to implicitly bring out the various concerns and commitments of the region.

We welcome contributions in the form of articles, commentaries, fiction, poems, photographs, essays, videos, cartoons, and memes, among others to reflect on the following questions and beyond:

Is there any difference in everyday life from the colonial to the post-colonial government in the region? What has been the nature of state-making in India’s North-East? How are social boundaries formed, maintained, transgressed and crossed in the region? Will there be a New North-East, concomitant to the invocation of ‘New India’ by Narendra Modi? Who defines indigenous and autochthonous in the North-East? Who envisions and finalises the measurement of North-East’s legitimate history? What is the role of ethnology and anthropology in museumization and governing the people and their land? Why are indigenous models of development bypassed in the development of the region? Are people in the North-East still a ‘known’ category, if so how and why? Is the scholarship that reflects, articulates, and defines the North-East adequate? How does one deal with the egoistic and Mein-Kampf like literature and action that are home to the North-East? Who are the ‘Others’ in the various states of the North-East? What is the nature of relationship and interaction of the ‘great-traditions’, ‘little traditions’, and the syncretic world of beliefs? Are cultural debts that make up broader identities and inter-ethnic agro-cultural-complex such as Assamese, Meitei or Mi-Zo acknowledged with humility? These are some of the questions that stir our collective interest in the region and its specificities.

We look forward to your contribution, and hope that together we can re-think, re-articulate, write, read, discuss and debate about the various issues and life-worlds of India’s North-East and beyond.

Thanking You,

The Pangsau Collective